¹ Of course, A₂ may be an activity which will so change E₁ as to produce S, when A₁ will recur. That is, the process of adjustment involves modifications, not only of the activity, but of the environment as well.

² That an activity does tend to adjust itself to the environment follows from the definition of “its” environment. For the latter consists of just these characteristics whose changes are accompanied by corresponding changes in the activity. Hence it is not the same activity which takes place in their absence as in their presence. It is this change which is called “adjustment.”

³ In the simplest case, Q is simply the negation of P, and the “law” is analytic.

⁴ They are roughly what Peirce called the “dynamic interpretants” of signs.

⁵ As developed in G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago, 1934.

⁶ Thus divergence of interest may arise even though the impulses concerned are very similar, because of false judgments of relevance of courses of action. This whole problem will be reconsidered in the last section.

⁷ Cf. E. Rignano, The Psychology of Reasoning. New York, 1923.

⁸ In terms developed by C. W. Morris in his Foundations of the Theory of Signs (Chicago, 1938), the symbols have pragmatical rules, but no semantical ones.

⁹ Of course the norm may be (and usually is) elliptically phrased, so that the reference to the impulse is only implicit.

¹⁰ This is an impirical judgment, an evaluation based on evidence, more and more confirmed by the increasing specialization of function in civilized societies.

¹¹ Senator Taft of Ohio, on Memorial day, 1939.

¹² Senator Byrd of Virginia, on the same day.

¹³ It is to be noted, however, that in Mannheim's usage, these terms emphasize the social function of these two kinds of symbolization.