Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-p67k6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T11:29:04.103Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Frege's Theory of Incomplete Entities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Michael David Resnik*
Affiliation:
University of Hawaii

Abstract

This paper examines four arguments in support of Frege's theory of incomplete entities, the heart of his semantics and ontology. Two of these arguments are based upon Frege's contributions to the foundations of mathematics. These are shown to be question-begging. Two are based upon Frege's solution to the problem of the relation of language to thought and reality. They are metaphysical in nature and they force Frege to maintain a theory of types. The latter puts his theory of incomplete entities in the paradoxical position of maintaining that it is no theory at all. Moreover, his metaphysics rules out well-known suggestions for avoiding this difficulty.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1965 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable