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Goldstick and O'Neill on “Truer Than”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ilkka Niiniluoto*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Helsinki
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Unioninkatu 40 B, 00170 Helsinki, FINLAND.

Abstract

In a recent article, Goldstick and O'Neill propose a definition for the comparative “truer than” relation between rival propositions. This definition is studied here in a context where the concept of “convexity” is well defined for propositions. It turns out that the Goldstick-O'Neill definition gives a reasonable but very restricted sufficient condition for the “truer than” relation, but fails as a necessary condition.

Information

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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