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Hard and Soft Accidental Uniformities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Eduardo H. Flichman
Eduardo H. Flichman*
Affiliation:
Ciclo Básico Común Universidad de Buenos Aires
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Abstract

I discuss some aspects of the epistemological distinction between laws of nature and accidental uniformities. In order that the exposition be self-contained I briefly provide a taxonomy proposed in another work for statements that appear in a scientific theory. Once this taxonomy has been presented I attempt to prove two very different types of accidental uniformities: hard and soft. The distinction is fundamental because the latter have frequently been confused with laws of nature. I try to justify why I believe that these statements are accidental uniformities and not laws of nature.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 1 , March 1995, pp. 31 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

This paper has been translated into English by Martin Eayrs. A substantial portion of this paper was read at the Coloquio de Filosofia de la Ciencia (Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science) organized by the Universidad Nacional de Catamarca, in Catamarca, Argentina, from 6–10 May 1994.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, SADAF (Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico), Bulnes 642, (1176) Capital Federal, Argentina.

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