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Holes and Determinism: Another Look

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stephen Leeds*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Colorado-Boulder

Abstract

I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar “hole argument” raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look like: for interesting theories, a harmless bit of infinitary logic puts in an appearance.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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