Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T18:13:34.759Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Horwich on ‘Semantic’ and ‘Metaphysical’ Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Davies*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario

Abstract

Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear upon the tenability of scientific realism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable