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How Natural Can Ontology Be?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Sharon L. Crasnow*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Riverside Community College
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Riverside Community College, 2001 Third Street, Norco, CA 92860-2600; e-mail: scrasnow@rccd.cc.ca.us.

Abstract

Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of “natural” in NOA is “nonphilosophical,” but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical attitude there are still legitimate philosophical questions to address.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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