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The Identity of Fact and Value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Ray Lepley*
Affiliation:
Bradley Polytechnic Institute, Peoria, Illinois

Extract

Social conflicts of ever widening scope have in recent years emphasized the importance of the problem of the relation of facts and values. This problem has received increasing attention from researchers and theorists in both the physical and social sciences. A number of interesting but by no means compatible solutions have been proposed.

Perhaps the simplest and most striking is the position of Carnap, Russell, and others, that value sentences, such as “A ought not to kill B” or “Killing is evil” are merely commands or expressions of wish and, as such, are emotional ejaculations or expletives but not statements which have any theoretical sense or enter (except as subject matter) into science. On this view the problem of the relation of fact and value statements is meaningless, or at least is not worth considering further.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1943

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