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Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Isaac Levi
Isaac Levi*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Columbia, University
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Abstract

Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 1985, pp. 390 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks are due to Richard Jeffrey, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Sidney Morgenbesser, Calvin Normore, Nils-Erik Sahlin, and especially Teddy Seidenfeld and the two referees for Philosophy of Science for helpful criticisms and comments.

References

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