Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-npj9w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-10T03:52:52.174Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Induction as Vindication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Wilfrid Sellars
Wilfrid Sellars*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

I shall attempt in this paper to give a rounded, if schematic, account of the concept of probability. My central concern will be to clarify the sense in which law-like statements (including ‘statistical’ law-like statements) are made probable by observational data which, in a sense equally demanding analysis, ‘accord’ with them.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , July 1964 , pp. 197 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © 1964 by Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

References

Bibliographical Note. The approach to probability and induction sketched in this paper was worked out independently over the past several years in courses and seminars. In the process of articulating it for publication, however, I have profitted greatly (I hope) from the following

[1] Barker, S.F., Induction and Hypothesis, Ithaca, 1957.Google Scholar
[2] Carnap, Rudolf, The Nature and Application of Inductive Logic, Chicago, 1951.Google Scholar
[3] Carnap, Rudolf, The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago, 1952.Google Scholar
[4] Day, J. P., Inductive Probability, London and New York, 1961.Google Scholar
[5] Hempel, C. G., “Inductive Inconsistencies” in Logic and Language (edited by Kazemier, B. H. and Vuysje, D.) Dordrecht (Holland), 1962.Google Scholar
[6] Feigl, Herbert, “De Principiis non Disputandum … ?” in Philosophical Analysis (edited by Max Black) Ithaca, 1950.Google Scholar
[7] Feigl, Herbert, “The Logical Character of the Principle of Induction,” reprinted in Readings in Philosophical Analysis (edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars), New York, 1949.Google Scholar
[8] Katz, Jerrold, The Problem of Induction and its Solution, Chicago, 1962.Google Scholar
[9] LeBlanc, Hugues, Statistical and Inductive Probability, New York, 1963.Google Scholar
[10] Salmon, W., “On Vindicating Induction,” Philosophy of Science, 30, 1963.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[11] Salmon, W., “Vindication of Induction,” in Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science (edited by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell), New York, 1961.Google Scholar
[12] Scheffler, I., The Anatomy of Inquiry, New York, 1963.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
[13] “Inference and Meaning,” Mind, 62, 1963.Google Scholar
[14] “Particulars” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 13, 1952.Google Scholar
[15] “Some Reflections on Language Games,” Philosophy of Science, 21, 1954.Google Scholar
[16] “Counterfactuals, Dispositions and the Causal Modalities,” in Volume II of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (edited by H. Feigl, G. Maxwell and M. Scriven) Minneapolis, 1957.Google Scholar
[17] “The Language of Theories,” in Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science (edited by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell), New York, 1961.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar