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Inexactness and Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

D. H. Mellor*
Affiliation:
Pembroke College, Cambridge University

Abstract

The paper∗∗ discusses the problems raised by the inexactness of experiential concepts for a deductivist account of theoretical explanation. The process of theoretical explanation is explicated in terms of the devising of exact forms of inexact concepts. Analysis of the adjustments of concepts and their exact forms to each other reveals an implicit criterion of adequacy for theories which is related to the principle of connectivity.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1966

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