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Laudan's Naturalistic Axiology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Karyn Freedman*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
*
†Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 215 Huron Street, 9th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1A1.

Abstract

Doppelt (1986,1990), Siegel (1990), and Rosenberg (1996) argue that the pivotal feature of Laudan's normative naturalism, namely his axiology, lacks a naturalistic foundation. In this paper I show that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of Laudan's use of the term ‘naturalism’. Specifically, I argue that there are two important senses of naturalism running through Laudan's work. Once these two strands are made explicit, the objection raised by Doppelt and others simply disappears.

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