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Mechanisms and Purposive Behavior III

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Larry Wright*
Affiliation:
University of California, Riverside

Abstract

It is commonly thought that the dispositional view of purposiveness is itself incompatible with the programmatic claims of neurophysiologists. In this paper, various versions of four arguments for this incompatibility are examined, and rejected as unsound. Central to the argument is a rough sketch of a “mechanistic” position which seems clearly compatible with a dispositional view of purposiveness.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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