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Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

James W. Cornman
James W. Cornman*
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Abstract

Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by “correlative physiological states and events instead.” But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by proposing definitions of the related terms, ‘observation term,’ and ‘theoretical term,’ and then classifying the term ‘sensation.’ The result is that although ‘sensation’ is a theoretical term, it is also a reporting term because it is used to refer to phenomena we are aware of. Consequently sensations are not postulated and cannot be eliminated merely because they are unnecessary for explanation.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , March 1968, pp. 45 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1968

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