Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T03:34:49.869Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

On an Inconsistency in Constructive Empiricism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay*
Affiliation:
Department of History & Philosophy, Montana State University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of History & Philosophy, Montana State University, Bozeman, MT 59717; e:mail: UHIPB@Trex.Oscs.Montana.edu

Abstract

I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable