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On Analyzing the Standards of Forensic Evidence: A Reply to Schoeman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

L. Jonathan Cohen
L. Jonathan Cohen*
Affiliation:
The Queen's College, Oxford
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Abstract

Ferdinand Schoeman (1986) attempts to refute six arguments that I gave in The Probable and the Provable (1977, pp. 49–120) for not analyzing the standards of forensic proof in terms of any concept of probability that conforms to the familiar principles of the mathematical calculus of chance. But he evidently does not appreciate the strength of the case for rejecting the validity of any such analysis. In the course of discussing his criticisms, I shall add a seventh argument to fortify my position, though I concede that the second of my original arguments has to be discarded.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 1987, pp. 92 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

Cohen, L. J. (1970), The Implications of Induction. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (1977), The Probable and the Provable. Oxford: Clarendon ress.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (forthcoming), “The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof”, Boston University Law Review 66.Google Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (1986), “Twelve Questions about Keynes's Concept of Weight”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37: 263–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schoeman, F. (1987), “Cohen on Inductive Probability and the Law of Evidence”, Philosophy of Science 54: 76–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schum, D. A., and Martin, A. W. (1982), “Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence”, Law and Society Review 17: 105–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar