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On Mechanical Recognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

R. J. Nelson
R. J. Nelson*
Affiliation:
Case Western Reserve University
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that human pattern recognition can be simulated by automata. In particular, I show that gestalt recognition and recognition of family resemblances are within the capabilities of sufficiently complex Turing machines. The argument rests on elementary facts of automata and computability theory which are used to explicate our preanalytic, informal concepts concerning gestalt patterns and recognition. The central idea is that of a machine which “knows” its own structure. Although the paper thus aims to support mechanism, especially as a framework hypothesis for perception, it contains suggestions for philosophy of science and philosophy of language as well. Some of these suggestions are sketched in the final section.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , March 1976, pp. 24 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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