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Ontic Realism and Scientific Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael Bradie*
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University

Abstract

Wesley Salmon defends an ontic realism that distinguishes explanatory from descriptive knowledge. Explanatory knowledge makes appeals to (unobservable) theoretical acausal mechanisms. Salmon presents an argument designed both to legitimize attributing truth values to theoretical claims and to justify treating theoretical claims as descriptions. The argument succeeds but only at the price of calling the distinction between explanation and description into question. Even if Salmon’s attempts to distinguish causal mechanisms from other mechanisms are successful, the assumed centrality of the appeal to such mechanisms in providing scientific explanations is left open by Salmon’s account.

Information

Type
Realism and Anti-Realism
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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