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Operant Conditioning and Teleology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Douglas V. Porpora*
Affiliation:
Temple University

Abstract

This paper defends the relevance of Taylor's (1964) critique of S-R behaviorism to Skinner's model of operant conditioning. In particular, it is argued against Ringen (1976) that the model of operant conditioning is a nonteleological variety of explanation. Operant conditioning is shown unable, on this account, to provide a parsimonious and predictive explanation of the behavior of higher level organisms. Finally, it is shown that the principle of operant conditioning implicitly assumes a teleological capacity, the admission of which renders the principle of operant conditioning superfluous.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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