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A Paradox for Empiricism (?)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Igor Douven*
Affiliation:
University of Leuven

Abstract

According to van Fraassen, constructive empiricism yields a better account of science than does scientific realism. One particularly important advantage van Fraassen claims his position to have over scientific realism is that the former can make sense of science without invoking (what he calls) pre-Kantian metaphysics. In the present paper the consistency of van Fraassen’s position is put in doubt. Specifically, it will be argued that van Fraassen faces the paradox that he cannot do with nor without the pre-Kantian metaphysics he abhors.

Information

Type
Realism and Anti-Realism
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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