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Particulars and Acquaintance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Laird Addis
Laird Addis*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

Philosophers who hold that the correct ontological analysis of things includes both properties and particulars have often been pressed to “show” the particular. If we are not acquainted with them, it is argued, then we should not suppose that they exist. I argue that, while we do have good and sufficient reasons for supposing there to be particulars, we are not acquainted with them. To suppose that we are acquainted with them is to treat particulars as if they were properties and to fail to realize how radically different particulars are from properties. The relevance of these matters to some considerations of “simplicity” and the principles of empiricism is explored.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , September 1967, pp. 251 - 259
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Allaire, Edwin B., “Bare Particulars,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1–2, January-February 1963.Google Scholar
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