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Particulars, Positional Qualities, and Individuation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

L. Nathan Oaklander
L. Nathan Oaklander*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan-Flint
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Abstract

In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay—a bare particular—does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay—a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premise that only particulars can ground individuation as deeply as is required, it follows that Bergmann and Hausman have not proved particulars are necessary and that positional qualities are insufficient for individuation.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , September 1977, pp. 478 - 490
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Silvano Miracchi and Philosophy of Science's anonymous referee for helpful comments, and the Faculty Research and Special Projects Fund of The University of Michigan for their support.

References

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