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Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

George A. Reisch
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Abstract

I criticize conceptual pluralism, as endorsed recently by John Dupré and Philip Kitcher, for failing to supply strategies for demarcating science from non-science. Using creation-science as a test case, I argue that pluralism blocks arguments that keep creation-science in check and that metaphysical pluralism offers it positive, metaphysical support. Logical empiricism, however, still provides useful resources to reconfigure and manage the problem of creation-science in those practical and political contexts where pluralism will fail.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 65 , Issue 2 , June 1998, pp. 333 - 348
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1998

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, 5246 N. Kenmore Ave., #1N, Chicago, IL 60640.

‡

I would like to thank Giovanni Camardi, Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Hasok Chang, Richard Creath, Michael Davis, John Dupré, Stuart Glennan, Gerald Holton, David Hull, Philip Kitcher, Bob Ladenson, Greg Mikkelson, Alan Richardson, Jessica Riskin, Warren Schmaus, Jack Snapper, David Stump, Thomas Uebel, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions about earlier versions of this paper.

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