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Postulates of Behaviorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

William Stephenson*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago

Extract

We propose to take issue with a neo-behaviorist (19) upon what might seem to be a minor detail, and about which we are sure that, upon reflection, he would not differ from us. It has to do with the use of the word experience in a basic postulate of behaviorism. Even if by a hair's breadth this implies something categorically different from behavior, then, it seems to us, the essential meaning of behaviorism has been missed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1953

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