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Pragmatism and the Science of Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Hobert W. Burns*
Affiliation:
Rutgers University

Abstract

Many pragmatic philosophers insist that causality in human behavior is to be explained by psychological field theorism rather than by modern behaviorism. This paper attempts to demonstrate (1) that pragmatists often support one aspect of an untenable disjunction in psychological theory, (2) that the asserted disjunction is but a methodological distinction, and (3) that the causal order in human behavior is most likely to be profitably described, predicted, or explained by the methods of modern behaviorism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association

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