Hostname: page-component-6898cfcb55-th4rj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-11T18:09:32.447Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Probabilistic Causality: Reply to John Dupré

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ellery Eells
Ellery Eells*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Wisconsin-Madison
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

John Dupré (1984) has recently criticized the theory of probabilistic causality developed by, among others, Good (1961–62), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980). He argues that there is a tension or incompatibility between one of its central requirements for the presence of a causal connection, on the one hand, and a feature of the theory pointed out by Elliott Sober and me (1983), on the other. He also argues that the requirement just alluded to should be given up. I defend the theory against Dupré‘s criticisms and conclude with comments on Dupré‘s appraisal of the bearing of his arguments on the nature of probabilistic causal laws.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 1987, pp. 105 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

†

This paper is based on my commentary on the version of Dupré's paper (1984) read at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, March 1983. I thank Elliott Sober for useful comments and the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School for financial support.

References

REFERENCES

Cartwright, N. (1979), “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies”, Noûs 13: 419–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dupré, J. (1984), “Probabilistic Causality Emancipated”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy IX: Causation and Causal Theories, French, P. A., Uehling, T. E. Jr., and Wettstein, H. K. (eds.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 169–75.Google Scholar
Eells, E. (1986), “Probabilistic Causal Interaction”, Philosophy of Science 53: 52–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eells, E., and Sober, E. (1983), “Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity”, Philosophy of Science 50: 35–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giere, R. N. (1979), Understanding Scientific Reasoning. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.Google Scholar
Giere, R. N. (1980), “Causal Systems and Statistical Hypotheses”, in Applications of Inductive Logic, Cohen, L. J. and Hesse, M. B. (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 251–70.Google Scholar
Good, I. J. (1961–62), “A Causal Calculus I–II”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 305–18; 45: 43–51. Errata and Corrigenda, 49: 88.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Skyrms, B. (1980), Causal Necessity. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Sober, E. (1982), “Frequency Dependent Causation”, Journal of Philosophy 79: 247–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suppes, P. (1970), A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.Google Scholar