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Rationality and Charity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Paul Thagard and
Richard E. Nisbett
Paul Thagard
Affiliation:
Department of Humanities University of Michigan, Dearborn
Richard E. Nisbett
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Abstract

Quine and others have recommended principles of charity which discourage judgments of irrationality. Such principles have been proposed to govern translation, psychology, and economics. After comparing principles of charity of different degrees of severity, we argue that the stronger principles are likely to block understanding of human behavior and impede progress toward improving it. We support a moderate principle of charity which leaves room for empirically justified judgments of irrationality.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , June 1983, pp. 250 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For helpful comments, we are grateful to Denis Dutton, Allan Gibbard, Alvin Goldman, Daniel Hausman, Daniel Kahneman, Susan Kus, John McCumber, Daniel Moerman, and Stephen Stich. We also thank Ed Sammons for editorial assistance.

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