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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Preanalytically, we are all scientific realists. But both philosophers and scientists become uncomfortable when forced into analysis. In the case of scientists, this discomfort often arises from practical difficulties in setting out a carefully described set of objects which adequately account for the phenomena with which they are concerned. This paper offers a set of representative examples of these difficulties for contemporary physicists. These examples challenge the traditional realist vision of mature scientific activity as struggling toward an ontologically well-defined world picture. They challenge antirealist alternatives as well.
Research for this paper was partially supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES–86–18758. I would like to thank Paul Teller, Arthur Fine, Ernan McMullin, and the referees for comments on earlier versions. A version was read at the Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting in 1988.