Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-npj9w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-10T02:54:08.632Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Relativity and Persistence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Yuri Balashov
Yuri Balashov*
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, 107 Peabody Hall, The University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602; e-mail: yuri@arches.uga.edu.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The nature of persistence of physical objects over time has been intensely debated in contemporary metaphysics. The two opposite views are widely known as “endurantism” (or “three-dimensionalism”) and “perdurantism” (“four-dimensionalism”). According to the former, objects are extended in three spatial dimensions and persist through time by being wholly present at any moment at which they exist. On the rival account, objects are extended both in space and time and persist by having “temporal parts,” no part being present at more than one time. Relativistic considerations seem highly relevant to this debate. But they have played little role in it so far. This paper seeks to remedy that situation. I argue that considerations based on the special theory of relativity and the notion of coexistence favor perdurantism over endurantism.

Information

Type
Philosophy of Physics and Chemistry
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Sep., 2000 , 2000 , pp. S549 - S562
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

‡

My thanks to Rob Clifton for insightful criticism. I am indebted to Darrin Belousek, Mike Bergmann, Paddy Blanchette, Peter Bokulich, Carolyn Brighouse, Jim Cushing, Mauro Dorato, Mark Heller, Don Howard, John Kennedy, John Leslie, Mike Loux, Trenton Merricks, Mike Rea, Mike Thrush, and Lyle Zynda for many helpful discussions and comments. This paper draws partly on the material of a longer article forthcoming in Philosophical Studies under the title “Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time.” This material is used here by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.

References

Sider, Ted (1997), “Four-Dimensionalism”, The Philosophical Review 106: 197–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Inwagen, Peter (1990), “Four-dimensional Objects”, Noûs 24: 245–255.CrossRefGoogle Scholar