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Renormalizing Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jarrett Leplin*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina, Greensboro

Abstract

The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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