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Scientific Discovery and Maxwell's Kinetic Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Peter Achinstein*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins University

Abstract

By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that he had no reason to believe true. In this paper I develop a position that explains why they were worth considering, and that rejects the retroductive position that a hypothesis is worth considering when, if true, it would explain the observed data.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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