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Segregation That No One Seeks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

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Abstract

This article examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demonstrate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states among agents of the same type. This is quite different from Schelling-like behavior and suggests (in his terms) that segregation is an instance of macrobehavior that can arise from a wide variety of micromotives.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Figure 0

Figure 1Example equilibrium pattern (). a, Initial random configuration; b, final equilibrium pattern.

Figure 1

Figure 2Plot of t-values for community size 8.

Figure 2

Figure 3Community sizes 5–20.

Figure 3

Figure 4Equilibrium cluster sizes.

Figure 4

Figure 5Cluster size distributions.