Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T20:25:49.825Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Solipsism: An Essay in Psychological Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Ian I. Mitroff*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh

Extract

The thesis of this paper is that in dealing with problems of “mind,” the philosopher of mind needs to be as well grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. psychology, anthropology) as the philosopher of the physical sciences needs to be grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. physics). The thesis of this paper is also that the psychological analysis of solipsism and the philosophical analysis are not independent (or at least not independent in all of their aspects), and that therefore the psychological analysis sheds light on the philosophical, and vice versa. It is argued that solipsism is untenable on at least two grounds: because (1) there are no such physical phenomena as acts of “immediate perception,” and because (2), that there can be no such thing as an “individual mind” without some form of a “group mind.”

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable