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Some Problems of Perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Douglas Lewis
Douglas Lewis*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Abstract

Many philosophers have maintained that secondary qualities are private mental entities. In this paper I use the discussions of H. A. Prichard, Berkeley and G. E. Moore on the status of secondary qualities to bring out the assumptions that underlie this view. One of these is that secondary qualities are particular. I show that Prichard holds these assumptions and then I attempt to diagnose why he holds them. In the course of this diagnosis I explore several senses of ‘dependent’ which play a role in this view. Finally, I show that a causal dependence of secondary qualities upon the perceiver will not lead to the conclusion that secondary qualities are private unless the philosophical thesis that they are particular is already assumed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , March 1970, pp. 100 - 113
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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