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Tendencies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Quentin Gibson
Quentin Gibson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Australian National University
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Abstract

The question is raised, what is going on when there is a tendency for something to happen, but it does not happen. A conspicuous case is that in which there is an equilibrium between opposing forces. One answer, given, for example, by Anscombe and Geach, Harré, and Bhaskar, is that such tendencies are in a sense real, though not manifest. The other answer, given, for example, by Braithwaite and Mackie, is that statements of tendencies are conditional statements about what is manifest but ones in which some antecedents are not specified. The first of these answers is criticized and the second defended.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , June 1983, pp. 296 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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