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Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Grover Maxwell*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota

Abstract

Utilizing Carnap's notions of “questions [or assertions] within a framework” and “questions [or assertions] about a framework” and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities—in particular, that of theoretical entities—is adumbrated.

In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given.

Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1962

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