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Theory-Conjunction and Mercenary Reliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

J. D. Trout*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626, USA.

Abstract

Scientific realists contend that theory-conjunction presents a problem for empiricist conceptions of scientific knowledge and practice. Van Fraassen (1980) has offered a competing account of theory-conjunction which I argue fails to capture the mercenary character of epistemic dependence in science. Representative cases of theory-conjunction developed in the present paper show that mercenary reliance implies a “principle of epistemic symmetry” which only a realist can consistently accommodate. Finally, because the practice in question involves the conjunction of theories, a version of realism more robust than the “entity realism” of Cartwright (1983, 1989) and Hacking (1983) is required to explain the success of theory-conjunction.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1992

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