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There Is No Special Problem of Mindreading in Nonhuman Animals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

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Abstract

There is currently a consensus among comparative psychologists that nonhuman animals are capable of some forms of mindreading. Several philosophers and psychologists have criticized this consensus, however, arguing that there is a “logical problem” with the experimental approach used to test for mindreading in nonhuman animals. I argue that the logical problem is no more than a version of the general skeptical problem known as the theoretician’s dilemma. As such, it is not a problem that comparative psychologists must solve before providing evidence for mindreading.

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Type
Research Article
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