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Truth, Content, and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Thomas R. Grimes
Thomas R. Grimes*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Arkansas State University
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Abstract

After presenting the major objections raised against standard formulations of the H-D method of theory testing, I identify what seems to be an important element of truth underlying the method. I then draw upon this element in an effort to develop a plausible formulation of the H-D method which avoids the various objections.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 1990 , pp. 514 - 522
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to John Pollock, Lowell Nissen, and an anonymous referee for this journal for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Support for this paper was provided in part by a research grant from Arkansas State University.

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