Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T08:31:41.864Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Two Faces of Intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Suzanne Cunningham
Suzanne Cunningham*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Loyola University, Chicago
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Philosophy Department, Loyola University, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626.
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 3 , September 1997, pp. 445 - 460
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

‡

My thanks to Sara Waller, E. J. Neafsey, the Philosophy Department at Canterbury University in New Zealand, and the participants in the conference on Intentionality at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, for their many helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

Bickhard, Mark H. (1991), “Cognitive Representation in the Brain”, in Encyclopedia of Human Biology. San Diego: Academic Press; 2: 547–558.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S. and Sejnowski, T. J. (1992), The Computational Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford.10.7551/mitpress/2010.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crick, Francis (1984), “Function of the thalamic reticular complex: The searchlight hypothesis”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 81: 4586–4590.10.1073/pnas.81.14.4586CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Damasio, Antonio (1994), Descartes' Error. New York: Putnam.Google ScholarPubMed
Dewey, John (1971), “The Theory of Emotions”, in Early Works, vol. 4. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. [Orig. Pub. 1894–1895.]Google Scholar
Dretske, Fred (1988), Explaining Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.Google Scholar
Dretske, Fred (1995), Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.Google Scholar
James, William (1983), Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Orig. Pub. 1890.]Google Scholar
LeDoux, Joseph (1989), “Cognitive-Emotional Interactions in the Brain”, Cognition and Emotion 3(4): 267–289.10.1080/02699938908412709CrossRefGoogle Scholar
LeDoux, Joseph (1994), “Emotion, Memory, and the Brain”, Scientific American June: 50–57.10.1038/scientificamerican0694-50CrossRefGoogle Scholar
LeDoux, Joseph and Hirst, William (eds.) (1986), Mind and Brain. Dialogues in Cognitive Neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lyons, William (1980), Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511609244CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, Ruth (1984), Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.Google Scholar
Millikan, Ruth (1993), White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford.Google Scholar
Newman, James (1995), “Thalamic contributions to attention and consciousness”, Consciousness and Cognition 4(2): 172–193.10.1006/ccog.1995.1024CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Roberts, Robert (1988), “What an Emotion Is”, Philosophical Review 97(2): 183–209.10.2307/2185261CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schachter, Stanley and Singer, Jerome (1962), “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional States”, Psychological Review 69(5): 379–399.10.1037/h0046234CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solomon, Robert (1973), “Emotions and Choice”, Review of Metaphysics 27: 20–41.Google Scholar
Solomon, Robert and Calhoun, Cheshire (eds) (1984), What is an Emotion? Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar