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Understanding Bias in Scientific Practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Nancy E. Shaffer
Nancy E. Shaffer*
Affiliation:
University of California, Davis
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Abstract

Methodological objectivism is a conception of bias which obscures the contingent and limited nature of methodological principles behind the guise of fixed a priori standards. I suggest as an alternative a more flexible view of the operation of bias which I call the attribution model. The attribution model makes explicit the working principles of both parties to an actual charge of bias. It enables those involved to identify the issues in dispute between them, and is the basis for an approach to handling charges of bias within the process of discussion and negotiation which characterizes normal scientific decision-making.

Information

Type
Methodology Naturalized and Contextualized
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996, pp. S89 - S97
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, CA 95616.

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