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Well-Being as an Object of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

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Abstract

The burgeoning science of well-being makes no secret of being value laden: improvement of well-being is its explicit goal. But in order to achieve this goal its concepts and claims need to be value adequate; that is, they need, among other things, to adequately capture well-being. In this article I consider two ways of securing this adequacy—first, by relying on philosophical theory of prudential value and, second, by the psychometric approach. I argue that neither is fully adequate and explore an alternative. This alternative requires thorough changes in the way philosophers theorize about well-being.

Information

Type
Everyday Concepts and Scientific Concepts
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Figure 0

Table 1.Theories, Constructs, and Measures