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When Probabilistic Support is Inductive

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Alberto Mura
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Abstract

This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of “going beyond” is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are purely inductive.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , June 1990 , pp. 278 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank David Miller for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Marcello Pera for help and private discussions on this topic. Special thanks are to be reserved for an anonymous referee: the final version of this note has been considerably influenced by his remarks. The responsibility for what is asserted in it rests however entirely with me. I am also indebted to Piers Bursill-Hall for his stylistic suggestions.

References

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