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Why General Relativity Does Need an Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Gordon Belot
Gordon Belot*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Abstract

There is a widespread impression that General Relativity, unlike Quantum Mechanics, is in no need of an interpretation. I present two reasons for thinking that this is a mistake. The first is the familiar hole argument. I argue that certain skeptical responses to this argument are too hasty in dismissing it as being irrelevant to the interpretative enterprise. My second reason is that interpretative questions about General Relativity are central to the search for a quantum theory of gravity. I illustrate this claim by examining the interpretative consequences of a particular technical move in canonical quantum gravity.

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank John Earman and Carlo Rovelli for many helpful conversations concerning the interpretative problems of quantum gravity. I would also like to acknowledge the generous support of SSHRC.

‡

Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

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