Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-14T08:13:31.474Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael A. Bishop
Michael A. Bishop*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Iowa State University
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Are thought experiments nothing but arguments? I argue that it is not possible to make sense of the historical trajectory of certain thought experiments if one takes them to be arguments. Einstein and Bohr disagreed about the outcome of the clock-in-the-box thought experiment, and so they reconstructed it using different arguments. This is to be expected whenever scientists disagree about a thought experiment's outcome. Since any such episode consists of two arguments but just one thought experiment, the thought experiment cannot be the arguments.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , December 1999, pp. 534 - 541
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, 402 Catt Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011; e-mail: mikebish@iastate.edu.

‡

I would like to thank John Norton, Niall Shanks, Jonathan Sutton, Loretta Torrago, David Rudge, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.

References

Bishop, Michael (1998), “An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments”, in Shanks, Niall (ed.), Idealization IX: Idealization in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 63. Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 19–33.Google Scholar
Bohr, Niels (1949), “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics”, in Schilpp, P. (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. Evanston, IL: The Library of Living Philosophers, 199–242.Google Scholar
Forge, John (1991), “Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Physical Science”, in Horowitz and Massey 1991, 209–222.Google Scholar
Horowitz, Tamara and Massey, Gerald J. (eds.) (1991), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield PublishersGoogle Scholar
Irvine, Andrew D. (1991), “On the Nature of Thought Experiments in Scientific Reasoning”, in Horowitz and Massey 1991, 149–166.Google Scholar
Lennox, James (1991), “Darwinian Thought Experiments: A Function for Just-So Stories”, in Horowitz and Massey 1991, 223–246.Google Scholar
Nersessian, Nancy (1993), “Thought Experimenting as Mental Modeling”, in Hull, D. and Forbes, M. (eds.), PSA 1992, vol. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 291–301.Google Scholar
Norton, John (1991), “Thought Experiments in Einstein's Work”, in Horowitz and Massey 1991, 129–148.Google Scholar
Norton, John. (1996), “Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 333–366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pais, Abraham (1982), ‘Subtle is the Lord ...‘. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Rescher, Nicholas (1991), “Thought Experimentation in Presocratic Philosophy”, in Horowitz and Massey 1991, 31–42.Google Scholar
Sorensen, Roy (1992), Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar