¹ See for example North, Joanna, ‘Wrongdoing and Forgiveness’, Philosophy 62 (1987), 499–508.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Hampton, Jean, ‘The Retributive idea’, in Murphy, Jeffrie G. and Hampton, Jean, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 155.Google Scholar

³ It may be important here whether we see the act as ‘in character’ with the agent. It may not be reasonable to ‘identify’ the deed with the doer unless we take the deed to reflect a stable disposition of the doer. But even acknowledging this, it is difficult not to see a deliberate bad deed as reflecting some negative feature of the agent, even if peripheral to her overall character.

⁴ This is argued by Wilson, John, ‘Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance’, Philosophy 63 (1988), 534–535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Wilson op. cit. argues to the contrary, claiming that forgiveness requires repentance because a wrongdoer's failure to recognize his fault or make amends provides a conceptual obstacle to the restoration of the original relationship with the wronged party. However, while the thought here is important, I do not think it shows quite what Wilson wants it to. A woman suing for divorce on the grounds of unreasonable behaviour may accept that her spouse is truly sorry for what he has done, and thus over-come her resentment towards him, but still not wish for the marriage to continue. Thus, even if repentance is necessary to restore certain intimate relationships, it may still be false that forgiveness requires such restoration. Perhaps the woman fears repetition of the behaviour, or perhaps she simply loses interest in the relationship, while bearing no grudge.

⁶ The suggestion that we speak of resentment on our own behalf, but indignation on behalf of others, comes from Hampton: whether or not there is a good semantic reason to do so, it is certainly useful to keep such a distinction in mind.

⁷ It is important, however, that the debtor acknowledge that it is his debt which is being paid by the benefactor, and that the benefactor intend it as such. Otherwise, were Smith to gain an unexpected and unrelated windfall equivalent to what he lent, Robinson would be permitted not to repay his debt—an absurd consequence.

⁸ See T. M. Knox (ed.) Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Oxford University Press, 1976). Hegel takes the purpose of punishment to be the anulment of a wrong, by attacking the ‘particular will’ which is the living embodiment of that wrong. This interesting idea has some resonance in Hampton's defence of the idea that punishment is an affirmative act aimed at defeating the offender.

⁹ Epicurus' case against the possibility of harm befalling the dead really consists of at least two elements. One element stresses that the dead lack sensation, and therefore (in accordance with Epicurean hedonism) cannot be victims of ill fortune; another maintains that death cannot be bad because the supposed subjects of the ill fortune do not exist. The latter point is probably intended to back up the former, but it can be assessed in its own right as well. See ‘Letter to Menoeceus’, in Epicurus: The Extant Remains, trans. Bailey, Cyril (Oxford University Press, 1926).Google Scholar