^{page 422 note 1} SoPrice, , Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, ch. vi (ed. 1758, p. 191): “To ask, why we are obliged to practise virtue, to abstain from what is wicked, or perform what is just, is the very same as to ask, why we are obliged to do what we are obliged to doGoogle Scholar.” Cf. p. 187: “It follows that rectitude is a law, as well as a rule to us; that it not only directs, but binds all, as far as it is perceived.” P. 181: “Obligation to action, and rightness of action, are plainly coincident or identical; so far so, that we cannot form a notion of the one, without taking in the other.”

^{page 423 note 1} On this whole passage, see G. C. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries, ch. vii.

^{page 424 note 1} Means and End are interpreted differently by Hegel (Encycl., §§ 204 ff.). See Mctaggart's, criticism of his interpretation of the category (Commentary on Hegel's Logic, §§ 252–261).Google Scholar

^{page 424 note 2} See Croce, Philosophy of the Practical, Part I, Sect. I, c. 3.

^{page 427 note 1} As Bradley makes very clear (Ethical Studies, pp. 193–8), the process of moral decision is one of intuitive subsumption, as distinguished from explicit deduction from general rules. The particular decision is subsumed under the social conscience of the individual, representing the ethical background appropriated by him in the course of his life. The term “subsumption” must not be misunderstood. There need be no explicit reasoning; character, embodying social principles of conduct, may respond immediately to the situation that calls for action. Moreover, the system of habits, views, and preferences which forms what we call a man's character at any moment is fragmentary and incomplete; again, it is at every stage a process of active growth; hence the new situation is not merely subsumed under the preexisting character, but enriches and expands it. In every moral decision conscience (to use the common term) is modified to a greater or less degree. The “background,” whether consciously apprehended or not, never wholly suffices to account for the resulting intuition. This often comes as a bolt from the blue. In such cases it is futile to posit latent psychological antecedents, for which all evidence or possibility of verification is lacking. Cf. ProfessorTaylor's, remarks on Paul's, St. conversion in Contemporary British Philosophy, vol. ii, pp. 293–4.Google Scholar

^{page 428 note 1} Mind (N.S. 81, January 1912), under the title “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” It will be seen that in the earlier part of this paper I am much indebted to ProfessorPrichard, especially as regards his contention that the obligation to perform, an action cannot be proved but only “apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking.” Compare also the same writer's Inaugural Lecture at Oxford (Clarendon Press, 1928) on Duty and Interest, PP. 24, 25.Google Scholar

^{page 429 note 1} Utilitarianism, ch. ii, pp. 26, 27 (ed. 1901), and note. Cf. also Ross, W. D. on “The Nature of Morally Good Action” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1929, xi, ad init.)Google Scholar: “The notion of the morally good must be sharply distinguished from that of the right. It is only the doing of certain things, irrespective of the motive from which they are done, that is right. It is only the doing of things from certain motives that is morally good. This distinction, once we have reached it, is so clear as not to need proof. A right act, merely as such, has no value in itself.” DrBroad, (Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. iii, No. 11, pp. 297–8)Google Scholar argues to the same effect from the ascription of rightness to emotions, which are admittedly (he says) independent of our volition at the time. I questioned the legitimacy of this ascription to emotions in the preceding article. What to Dr. Ross appears self-evident is, I fear, to me a monstrous paradox.

^{page 430 note 1} See Mackenzie, , Manual of Ethics, p. 110.Google Scholar If he acts thus from the motive of duty, accompanied by feelings of resentment, we have either a case of mixed motives, affecting the morality of the action, or else, if the resentment is inoperative as a motive, the act is a right act. We disapprove the accompanying resentment because it is normally liable to operate and become determinate in wrong conduct. Actions motived by love of the good will be considered in a later paper, where it will be seen that the fact that they lie outside the boundaries of the moral field in no way derogates from their value.

^{page 431 note 1} So Price, , Review, pp. 78–80Google Scholar, after defining “action” to mean “not the bare external effect, or event produced; but the ultimate principle or rule of conduct, or the determination of a reasonable being, considered as accompany'd with, and arising from, the perception of some motives and reasons, and intended for some end,” continues with these words: “According to this sense of the word action, whenever the principle in conformity to which we act, or the thing ultimately intended, is different, the action is different, though the steps pursued, or the external effects produced, may be exactly the same. The external effect, or event, or, in other words, the matter of the action, is indeed the same; but nothing is plainer than that actions materially the same may be not only different, but opposite, according to the various ends aimed at, or principles of morality with which the matter of them is connected; otherwise, cruel and beneficent actions might be the same, as when, by the same steps, a man designedly saves or ruins his country.”

^{page 432 note 1} See Concluding Note.