¹ For some philosophical reflections on them, see Hartmann, N., Ethics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), Vols I–IIIGoogle Scholar, trans. S. Coit, especially Vol. II, Ch. XVIII; Myrna's, F. ‘Purity in Morals’, Monist 66 (1983), 283–297CrossRefGoogle Scholar, is a good critical discussion of Hartmann; and Kolenda, K. in Philosophy in Literature (Totowa: Barnes & Noble, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Chs 3–4, treats illuminatingly Dostoyevsky's and Melville's characters.

² An account of the different types of culpable moral failure is Milo's, R. D.Immorality (Princeton University Press, 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ ‘[S]tupidity pushed to a certain point is … immorality. Just so what is morality but high intelligence?’ James, H., The Golden Bowl (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 87.Google Scholar

⁴ For palpable illustrations, one should read her novels; I particularly recommend The Nice and the Good and The Black Prince; but here I shall make use of the essay ‘The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts’ in The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 1970), 77–104Google Scholar; parenthetical references are to the pages of this volume.

⁵ There is an interesting discussion of fantasy in Wollheim's, R.The Thread of Life (Harvard University Press, 1984), especially Chs III–IV.Google Scholar

⁶ See Gallie, W. B., Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964).Google Scholar

⁷ My view of moral perspectives resembles Nietzsche's in many ways. The extremely illuminating interpretation of Nietzsche by Nehamas, A., Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Harvard University Press, 1985)Google Scholar is particularly close to my view. I should note, therefore, that there is a crucial disagreement between my view and Nietzsche's: I think, while Nietzsche denies, that moral perspectives can be justified and criticized on independent grounds.

⁸ For an incomparable account of how this process occurs in one aspect of life, see Oakeshott's, M. ‘Political Education’, Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1962).Google Scholar

⁹ The analysis I have been giving so far is in general agreement with the view of morality suggested by Nussbaum's, M. C. ‘Flawed Crystals: James's The Golden Bowl and Literature as Moral Philosophy’, New Literary History 15 (1983), 25–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also the responses by Wollheim, Gardiner, and Putnam in the same volume. But Nussbaum stops here, at least in the above paper, while I think we should go on in the direction of aiming at reflective purity. Thus, what Nussbaum takes to be the mature attitude to morality, I think of only as a stage of moral development.

¹⁰ I feel obliged to note that, while I have no sympathy whatever for it, there is a groping in the German romantic tradition for the same conclusion as I have reached. See Heller's, E. ‘The Taking Back of the Ninth Symphony’, in In the Age of Prose (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 129–148.Google Scholar

¹¹ I am indebted to Annette Baier, James Kellenberger, Joel Kupperman, Lynne McFall, and Alexander Nehamas for very helpful comments. I read the paper at the conference on ‘The Virtues’ at the University of San Diego, February 1986. I am grateful to Jonathan Jacobs and Mike Martin for acting as commentators and for their criticisms.