^{page 72 note 1} It follows from the fact that there are grounds in experience for all beliefs that beliefs are evidence for the objective character of certain features of experience. When the ground is dominantly objective, a belief implies the certainty that the object of reference is qualified in some definite way leading to the belief, although it may not be known to possess all the qualities attributed to it in the belief; and when the grounds are dominantly subjective, the belief implies that the mind possesses certain essential characters, and that these may be significant in regard to the nature of the object to which the belief refers. In respect to the grounds for belief, it is assumed that there is no reason for doubt, and that belief thus carries with it certainty as to the nature of these grounds; but the question here raised is: Can it be inferred from the presence of beliefs not only that they imply the existence of certain grounds, but also that they provide reliable evidence for the assumption that the objects to which they refer exist as they are believed?

^{page 73 note 1} After reading this paper, a friend wrote to me: “A doubt crosses my mind as to whether you have not given the ‘man in the street’ credit for a larger measure of rationality than he deserves. In most of our beliefs there seems to be a very strong emotional element; so much so, in fact, that many people hang on to their beliefs long after they are furnished with evidence which rationally discredits them. If ‘the wish is father to the thought,’ then certainly it is often mother to the belief.”

I fully admit the contention that there may be a very strong emotional element in belief, and in addition I am prepared to admit that “many people hang on to their beliefs long after they are furnished with evidence which rationally discredits them.” Nevertheless, I also hold to the truth of the view here put forward that belief cannot be held against knowledge. In arriving at this opinion I have been greatly influenced by the manner in which man’s rational interpretation of his experience has actually interpenetrated his spiritual experience and modified his religious beliefs. In course of time many beliefs have been abandoned and others have been changed because they have been found incompatible with the rational interpretation of experience which is regarded as true. In this connection it is important to distinguish between being “furnished with evidence which rationally discredits” and “knowing.” A person's emotional bias resulting in the will to believe may resist evidence which one less prejudiced regards as rationally discrediting his beliefs; but it does not follow that the prejudiced person who retains the beliefs himself possesses the knowledge which discredits them. For instance, a person may hold to certain dogmatic religious beliefs and resist evidence supporting scientific principles which are incompatible with these beliefs. I maintain, however, that such a person does not possess knowledge of the scientific propositions. If he were satisfied that these are true, he would, like the scientist, be obliged to abandon or modify the dogmatic beliefs with which they are incompatible.