¹ The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. Kaye, K. B., 2 Vols. (Oxford, 1924), Vol. II, p. 336.Google Scholar

² Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 43–44.Google Scholar

³ Kaye, Vol. I, p. 55.Google Scholar

⁴ Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 48–49.Google Scholar

⁵ Kaye, Vol. I, p. 51.Google Scholar

⁶ See, for example, Norris, John: A discourse concerning the Measure of Divine Love (1693)Google Scholar; SirBlackmore, Richard: An Essay upon False Virtue (1716)Google Scholar; Law, William: A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life (1729)Google Scholar. Of course continental writeis such as Pascal, Pierre Bayle and Jacques Esprit were far from unknown in England. For a general survey see Lovejoy, Arthur O.: Reflections on Human Nature, especially Lecture V.Google Scholar

⁷ Reproduced in Kaye, Vol. II, facing p. 392Google Scholar. This announcement does not appear in subsequent editions. Cf., Kaye, Vol. I, p. 57.Google Scholar

⁸ Kaye, Vol. I, p. 57.Google Scholar

⁹ Letter, p. 18.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See, for example, Kaye, Vol. II, p. 102.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Kaye, Vol. I, p. liiiGoogle Scholar and passim.

¹² “… the more man knows of the world, either from reading or experience, the more he shall be convinc'd, that not only reveal'd as well as natural religion, but likewise humanity, reason, the interst of mankind, their peace and felicity, and almost every thing in nature pleads for toleration, except the national clergy in every country.” Free Thoughts on Religion (2nd ed.), p. 239.Google Scholar

¹³ As he does, for example, at Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 158–160.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 52–54Google Scholar Cf. the definition of ‘Politicians’ in Origin of Honour, pp. 40–41.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Kaye, Vol. II, p. 130.Google Scholar

¹⁶ An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (2nd ed.), p. 143.Google Scholar

¹⁷ “As Nature has framed the several species of beings as it were in a chain, so man seems to be placed as the middle link between angels and brutes … and as a man inclines to the angelic or brute part of his constitution, he is then denominated good or bad, virtuous or wicked.” The Spectator, No. 408.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Kaye, Vol. I, p. 39.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Origin of Honour, p. vi, p. ix.Google Scholar

²⁰ Free Thoughts, p. 216.Google Scholar

²¹ Cf. Mandeville's comments on Shaftesbury, , Kaye, Vol. 1, p. 323f.Google Scholar

²² Kaye, Vol. I, p. 260.Google Scholar

²³ Cf. John Noms: “Praise or Dispraise may be a probable Sign, or secondary Measure, but it can never be the primary Measure or Law of Verrue and Vice…. For Praise or Dispraise does not make, but suppose the difference of Vertue and Vice as already settled, and antecedent to it. A thing is not good because ‘tis praised, but is therefore praised because’ tis good.” (Cursory Reflections upon a Book call'd An Essay Concerning Human Understanding pp. 32–33)Google Scholar. This argument is as old as the Euthyphro, and so, of course, is the problem of what it is about certain actions which makes them virtuous and therefore praiseworthy. For Mandeville all that is necessary is that those who are praised should understand the praise as an acknowledgment of their worth.

²⁴ “[The passions] are the very Powers that govern the whole Machine; and whether they are perceived or not, determine or rather create the Will that immediately precedes every deliberate Action.” Origin of Honour, p. 6.Google Scholar

²⁵ Kaye, Vol. I, p. 56.Google Scholar

²⁶ Kaye, Vol. II, p. 129Google Scholar, Kaye conjectures that Mandeville introduced this concept with Butler specifically in mind.

²⁷ Origin of Honour, p. 3.Google Scholar

²⁸ Kaye, Vol. I, p. 124.Google Scholar

²⁹ Origin of Honour, pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

³⁰ Some Thoughts concerning Education, §. 70.Google Scholar

³¹ The Virgin Unmask'd, p. 73.Google Scholar

³² Origin of Honour, pp. x–xi.Google Scholar